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In 2017,1 district courts in the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit decided three cases that clarified issues arising under
the Clean Water Act (CWA). 2 The United States District Court for the
Southern District of Georgia preliminarily enjoined the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) and the Army Corps of Engineers from
3
enforcing the Waters of the United States Rule (WOTUS Rule), a
regulatory attempt to define the term "Waters of the United States,"
which is a jurisdictional threshold for agencies' regulatory authority
under the CWA. 4 Also, the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Alabama ruled that ongoing contamination that resulted from5
wholly past discharges of pollutants was not a violation of the CWA.
Finally, the United States District Court for the Middle District of
Florida ruled that Florida's statutory enforcement scheme for CWA
violations was not similar to the federal enforcement scheme because it
did not allow for persons unaffected by an alleged violation to have input
into the State's enforcement action, and therefore, an ongoing
enforcement action by Florida did6 not bar a CWA citizen suit brought by
plaintiffs for the same violations.
In other cases, the Eleventh Circuit reaffirmed its position on the kind
7
of evidence that is necessary to prove causation in a toxic tort case. The
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1. Travis M. Trimble, Environmental Law, Eleventh Circuit Survey, 69 MERCER L.
REv. 1133 (2018).
2. Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387
(2018)).
3. 33 C.F.R. § 328 (2018).
4. Georgia v. Pruitt, 326 F. Supp. 3d 1356 (S.D. Ga. 2018).
5. Day, LLC v. Plantation Pipe Line Co., 315 F. Supp. 3d 1219 (N.D. Ala. 2018).
6. Suncoast Waterkeeper v. City of St. Petersburg, No. 8:16-cv-3319-T-27AEP, 2018
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8960 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 19, 2018).
7. See Williams v. Mosaic Fertilizer, LLC, 889 F.3d 1239 (11th Cir. 2018).
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United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama ruled
that the required ante litem notice for a citizen suit under the
Endangered Species Act (ESA) s is not perfected until the necessary
parties have actually received the notice, and only at that time does the
sixty-day waiting period before the plaintiff can file suit begin to run. 9
I. CLEAN WATER ACT
In Georgia v. Pruitt, the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Georgia granted the plaintiffs'-Georgia and ten
other statesl -- motion for preliminary injunction, enjoining the EPA and
Army Corps of Engineers from enforcing the Waters of the United States
Rule, a rule issued by the agencies in 2015 intended to define "Waters of
the United States" for the purposes of establishing the agencies'
jurisdiction under the CWA. 12 The states challenged the WOTUS Rule on
the grounds that it violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) l"
14
and the CWA.
The agencies promulgated the WOTUS Rule to simplify and
streamline the agencies' approach to determining whether waters fell
within the definition of "Waters of the United States" under the CWA. A
water that is a "Water of the United States" is subject to many of the
permitting requirements of the CWA and its associated regulations,
including the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
administered by the EPA, and permits for the discharge of dredged or fill
material into wetlands, administered by the Corps. Thus, whether a
water falls within the definition of Waters of the United States is a
threshold jurisdictional issue for the agencies. 15
The court in Pruitt ruled that the states were likely to succeed on the
merits of their claim challenging the WOTUS Rule because the Rule
likely encompassed waters that did not meet the "significant nexus" test
set out in Rapanos v. United States16 by the Supreme Court of the United
l0

8. 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (2018).
9. Black Warrior Riverkeeper Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, No. 2:17-cv-00439LSC, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137322 (N.D. Ala. Aug. 14, 2018).
10. 326 F. Supp. 3d 1356 (S.D. Ga. 2018).
11. West Virginia, Alabama, Florida, Kansas, Kentucky, South Carolina, Utah,
Wisconsin, North Carolina, and Indiana. Id. at 1360.
12. Id. at 1370.
13. Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559
(2018)).
14. Pruitt, 326 F. Supp. 3d at 1360.
15. Id. at 1360-61.
16. 547 U.S. 715 (2006).
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States. 17 In Rapanos, a plurality of the Court held that in order for a
water to come within an agency's jurisdiction under the CWA, there must
be a significant nexus between the water and a navigable-in-fact water. 1s
The Court invalidated an agency rule that defined a tributary (included
within the definition of waters of the United States) as a water that "feeds
into a traditional navigable water [or tributary thereof] and possesses an
ordinary high-water mark."19 The Supreme Court concluded that
definition "seem[ed] to leave wide room for regulation of20drains, ditches,
and streams remote from any navigable-in-fact waters."
The district court stated that "[tihe same fatal defect appears to plague
the WOTUS Rule here." 21 The court noted that, as the term "tributary"
was defined in the WOTUS Rule, it could cover "a trace amount of water
so long as the 'physical indicators of a bed and banks and an ordinary
high water mark' can be found by 'mapping information' or 'remote
22
sensing tools' where actual physical indicators are 'absent in the field."'
The court concluded that the Rule's definition "is similar to the one
invalidated in Rapanos, and it carries with it the same concern that
Justice Kennedy had there-it seems 'to leave wide room for regulation
of drains, ditches, and streams remote from any navigable-in-fact
water."' 23 As a result, the court concluded that the Rule likely violated
24
the CWA.
25
The court also concluded that the Rule likely violated the APA. First,
the court concluded that the Rule was likely arbitrary and capricious
because it was "not in accordance with law," for the same reason that it
likely violated the CWA: it likely encompasses waters that do not "have
26
a nexus with any navigable-in-fact waters." Second, the court concluded
the final Rule was not a
that the Rule likely violated the APA because
27
Rule.
proposed
the
of
'logical outgrowth"
Finally, the court concluded that a preliminary injunction was an
appropriate remedy because the states demonstrated that they were
17. Pruitt, 326 F. Supp. 3d at 1364.
18. See id.
19. Id. (quoting Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 781).
20. Id. (quoting Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 781).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 1365 (quoting 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(c)(3) (2018)).
23. Id.
24. Id. at 1369.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 1365.
27. Id. at 1365-66 (citing Long Island Care at Home Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 160
(2007)). 'The final [R]ule must be a 'logical outgrowth' of the proposed [R]ule" in order to be
valid. Id. at 1365.
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likely to suffer irreparable harm in the form of loss of sovereignty over
state waters and monetary costs to handle permitting requirements over
additional waters that would be included under the Rule. 28 The court also
found that the likelihood of harm was both actual and imminent.29
In Day, LLC v. PlantationPipeline Co.,30 the District Court for the
Northern District of Alabama concluded that, among other things, the
continuing presence of gasoline contamination on the plaintiffs' property
resulting from a pipeline leak that had been repaired two years earlier
did not constitute a "continuous or intermittent violation" so as to give
the court subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' claim under the
citizen suit provision of the CWA.31 The court also concluded that the
plaintiffs' evidence was insufficient to show "an imminent and
substantial endangerment to human health" or the environment, a
necessary element of the plaintiffs' claim under the citizen suit provision
of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA).32 The court
granted summary judgment to the defendant-pipeline owners as to those
claims; the court also granted summary judgment to the defendants on
the plaintiffs' Alabama state law claims for wantonness, trespass, and
infliction of emotional distress. 33
A portion of the defendants' petroleum pipeline, carrying gasoline,
crossed the plaintiffs' property in northern Alabama. The defendants
repaired a dent in the pipeline under the plaintiffs' property in 1979. In
August 2014, the defendants discovered that the repair had leaked
gasoline from the pipeline into soil and surface water on the plaintiffs'
property. The defendants repaired the leak within two days of
discovering it and remediated the property over the next two years. 34 The
plaintiffs sued in 2016, alleging claims under the citizen suit provisions
of the CWA and the RCRA and under Alabama law for wantonness,
trespass, and infliction of emotional distress. 35
Underlying these claims was the plaintiffs' contention that the
pipeline continued to leak gasoline onto their property, which in turn was
based on the testimony of their expert to that effect. The defendants

28. Id. at 1367.
29. Id. at 1367-69.
30. 315 F. Supp. 3d 1219 (N.D. Ala. 2018).
31. Id. at 1240.
32. Id. at 1242, 1244; see also Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 6901-6991 (2018)).
33. Day, LLC, 315 F. Supp. 3d at 1244.
34. Id. at 1223.
35. Id. at 1244.

2019]

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

1011

a
moved for summary judgment on the plaintiffs' claims and also made
37
Daubert36 motion to exclude the testimony of the plaintiffs' expert.
The court first addressed the Daubert motion, noting that the
plaintiffs' expert's conclusion that the pipeline was continuing to leak
was crucial to the plaintiffs' CWA claim, because citizen suits under the
38
CWA could only be brought to remedy ongoing violations of the CWA.
The expert tested soil and groundwater on the property in 2017, and
those tests confirmed the presence of gasoline. The expert based his
opinion that the pipeline continued to leak on his opinion that the
gasoline he found "smell[ed] way too fresh [to be] two years old," and his
belief that the steep elevation of the location of the leak meant that if the
leak was two years old, gasoline in a free state would not still be found
39
near the location of the leak but would have migrated downhill.
The court granted the defendants' motion to exclude the expert's
testimony. 40 The court explained that the expert insufficiently explained
the methodology he used to distinguish the smell of fresh gasoline from
that of decayed gasoline or how his experience with remediation allowed
him to reach this conclusion. 4 1 The court also noted that the expert was
not a geologist and had not shown how he was qualified to testify on the
42
movement of gasoline through subsurface.
On the federal claims, the court first concluded that it did not have
jurisdiction over the CWA claim because the plaintiffs could not prove a
"continuous or intermittent" violation of the CWA. 43 The CWA's citizen
suit provision allows any person to bring suit against any person "alleged
to be in violation of' provisions of the CWA. 44 The Supreme Court, in
45
Gwaltney of Smithfield Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc.,
interpreted that language to mean a violation that was "continuous or
46
intermittent" as opposed to wholly past.

Although the court excluded the plaintiffs' expert's testimony that the
pipeline was continuing to leak at the time the plaintiffs filed suit, the
court took up the plaintiffs' alternative argument: that the continued

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
Day, LLC, 315 F. Supp. 3d at 1225.
Id. at 1226.
Id. at 1226-27.
Id. at 1226.
Id. at 1227.
Id.
Id. at 1234.
33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1) (2018).
484 U.S. 49 (1987).
Day, LLC, 315 F. Supp. 3d at 1234.
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presence of gasoline on their property constituted an ongoing violation of
the CWA. 47 The court noted that "[t]he Eleventh Circuit has not directly
ruled on what constitutes an ongoing violation" and noted further that
two competing interpretations had arisen in the courts. 48 Under the
broader interpretation, a defendant's "failure to undertake remedial
measures to remove the effects of a wholly past violation of the CWA
constitutes an ongoing violation." 49 The more narrow interpretation looks
50
to when the conduct that caused the violation took place.
The court chose the narrow approach, concluding that the lingering
contamination of the plaintiffs' property from the leak that had ceased in
2014 did not constitute an ongoing violation of the CWA.51 The court
distinguished a ruling of the District Court for the Northern District of
Georgia where the court concluded that the continued presence of fill
material in lakes did constitute an ongoing violation of the CWA.52 The
court in Day noted that the Northern District itself distinguished fill
material, which remains permanently where it is placed, from a 'leachate
53
plume, or petroleum products," which dissipate over time.
The court also rejected the plaintiffs' contention, based on a 2018
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit decision, 54 that the
CWA citizen suit provision applied to the present effects of past violations
because the RCRA citizen suit provision could do so.55 The court
disagreed with the Fourth Circuit that the citizen suit provisions of the
two acts were identical, noting that under CWA, "[c]essation of conduct,
e.g., the discharging of a pollutant .... means that there is no longer a
violation. On the other hand cessation of conduct does not necessarily
cure a violation of any 'permit, standard, regulation, condition,
requirement, prohibition, or order [under the RCRA citizen suit
provision]."'56 The court ultimately concluded that, because it had
rejected the plaintiffs' expert's testimony that the pipeline continued to
leak, and because the continued presence of gasoline on the property from
the leak that was repaired in 2014 did not constitute an ongoing violation
47. Id. at 1239.
48. Id. at 1236.
49. Id.
50. Id.

51. Id. at 1239.
52. City of Mountain Park v. Lakeside at Ansley, LLC, 560 F. Supp. 2d 1288, 1298
(N.D. Ga. 2008).
53. See Day, LLC, 315 F. Supp. 3d at 1237.
54. See Upstate Forever v. Kinder Morgan Energy Partners, L.P., 887 F.3d 637 (4th

Cir. 2018).
55. Day, LLC, 315 F. Supp. 3d at 1238; see 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(A) (2018).
56. Day, LLC, 315 F. Supp. 3d at 1238 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(A)).
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of the CWA, the court did not have jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' CWA
citizen suit claim, and therefore, granted summary judgment to the
57
defendants.
Second, the court concluded that the plaintiffs' evidence was
insufficient to establish that the gasoline on its property constituted an
imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment,
and therefore their RCRA citizen suit claim failed as well. 58 The court
determined that the plaintiffs' evidence showing harm on the property
was either related to the time of the leak in 2014, or was simply too
speculative to show a present threat of endangerment to health. 59 As to
a danger to the environment, the court noted that "[n]o binding precedent
has adequately discussed whether the presence of certain levels of
gasoline" presents a danger to the environment. 60 The plaintiffs
presented some evidence that gasoline was currently present in the soil
or groundwater of the property at levels that exceeded the EPA's
maximum contaminant levels of exposure to the components of gasoline,
but the court found that the "[plaintiffs.. . never attempt[ed] to explain
what the applicable standards mean or how they apply to the RCRA."61
Otherwise, the court found the plaintiffs' evidence related primarily to
2014, when the leak was discovered, rather than 2016, when the
plaintiffs filed suit, and thus was not relevant, or was lacking sufficient
62
support in the record.
This case is significant primarily for the court's clarification that the
continuing presence of contamination (other than dredged or fill
material) resulting from wholly past discharges of pollutants is not a
violation of the CWA.
In Suncoast Waterkeeper v.City of St. Petersburg,63 the District Court
for the Middle District of Florida ruled that the plaintiffs CWA citizen
suit was not barred by the State of Florida's enforcement action for the
same violations, because Florida's statutory enforcement scheme was not
comparable to the federal enforcement scheme established by the CWA.64

57. Id. at 1239.
58. Id. at 1242; 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B) (2018). This provision, the second of two
citizen suit provisions in § 6972, requires the plaintiff to prove that the defendant's "past
or present handling, storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal of any solid or
hazardous waste ...may present an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or
the environment." 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B).
59. Day, LLC, 315 F. Supp. 3d at 1242.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1243.
62. Id. at 1244.
63. No. 8:16-cv-3319-T-27AEP, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8960 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 19, 2018).
64. Id. at *12; see 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2018).
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The defendant, operator of St. Petersburg, Florida's municipal
wastewater treatment system, notified the Florida Department of
Environmental Protection (FDEP) of a "bypass" event in June 2016.65
FDEP responded by noting a pattern of bypasses following heavy rains
and requested a meeting with defendant "to discuss measures . . . to
eliminate ... the discharges/bypasses." 66 The meeting took place in June
2016 and, in September, the FDEP proposed a consent order addressing
the bypass issues. On September 28, the plaintiffs sent their ante litem
notice of alleged CWA violations related to the bypass events to the
defendant and filed a CWA citizen suit on December 2, 2016, alleging
that the defendant discharged pollutants in violation of the CWA.67
The defendant moved for summary judgment, asserting that the
plaintiffs' suit was barred because "the FDEP [had] commenced and
[was] diligently prosecuting an enforcement proceeding" with respect to
6
the alleged violations.
The court denied the defendant's motion. 69 The court, following on
McAbee v. City of Fort Payne,70 explained that, in order for
§ 1319(g)(6)(A)(ii) 71 of the CWA (relied on by the defendant) to bar a
citizen suit, three requirements must be met: "First, the state must have
'commenced' an enforcement procedure against the polluter[; s]econd, the
state must be 'diligently prosecuting' the enforcement proceedings[; and
third], the state's statutory enforcement scheme must be 'comparable' to
72
the federal scheme promulgated in 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)."
The court concluded that Florida's enforcement scheme for CWA
violations was not comparable to the federal scheme because, while "the
CWA provisions allow members of the general public, even those who
have not suffered a threatened or actual injury in fact, to participate in

65. Suncoast Waterkeeper, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8960, at *2. A "bypass" at a sewer
treatment plant is an intentional diversion of the waste stream from all or part of the
treatment process. See 40 C.F.R. § 122.41(m) (2018).
66. Suncoast Waterkeeper, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8960, at *2.
67. Id. at *3.
68. Id.
69. Id. at *2.
70. 318 F.3d 1248, 1249 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding that Alabama's enforcement scheme
was not comparable to the federal scheme and thus section 1319(g)(6)(A)(ii) did not bar the
plaintiffs CWA citizen suit in Alabama).
71. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(6)(A)(ii) (2018).
72. Suncoast Waterkeeper, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8960, at *4 (quoting McAbee, 318
F.3d at 1251). McAbee held that as to the third requirement, the state's statutory
enforcement scheme had to be comparable to the federal one in three respects: penalty
assessment, public participation, and judicial review. McAbee, 318 F.3d at 1256. See also
33 U.S.C. § 1319(g) (2018).
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the enforcement process," 73 Florida's enforcement scheme "does not
provide the general public with a comparable right to participate in the
enforcement proceedings," 74 but rather, 'limits participation to those
whose 'substantial interests' are affected." 75 The court found "no
distinction between the proposed consent order in this case and a
contested enforcement proceeding. The public participation provisions of
the CWA and Florida's scheme must [be] 'roughly comparable' [under
McAbee], regardless of the nature of the enforcement proceeding" in order
for the § 1319 bar to apply to a CWA citizen suit. 76 The court concluded
that they were not comparable because the Florida enforcement process
allowed "those whose substantial interests [were] affected by the
[consent] order" to participate in the process before the FDEP issued the
consent order--or to challenge the order itself.77
The court therefore denied the defendant's motion for summary
judgment.7 8 While this case is an unpublished decision of a district court,
the court found "Florida['s] public participation scheme [to be]
substantially similar to the Alabama scheme examined in McAbee,"
which the Eleventh Circuit held was not comparable to the federal
enforcement scheme and, therefore, did not serve to bar a CWA citizen
suit there. 79 The court's ruling suggests that Florida's enforcement
scheme also likely will not serve to bar a citizen suit under the CWA,
even if the other two requirements of the bar are met (the state has (1)
commenced an enforcement procedure; and (2) is diligently prosecuting
a civil penalty action with respect to the same alleged violations).
II. Toxic TORTS-EVIDENCE
In Williams v. Mosaic Fertilizer,LLC,80 a toxic tort case, the Eleventh
Circuit affirmed a district court decision to exclude the plaintiffs expert's
testimony linking the plaintiffs exposure to chemicals produced by the
81
defendant's fertilizer plant to numerous alleged pulmonary disorders.
The court also affirmed the district court's decision to exclude the
plaintiffs own testimony as to the diminution in value of her property

73.
F.3d at
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Suncoast Waterkeeper, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8960, at *5-6 (citing McAbee, 318
1257).
Id. at *6-7.
Id. at *7 (citing FLA. ADMIN. CODEANN. 28-106.111(2) (2018)).
Id.
Id. at *12.
Id.
Id. at *9.
889 F.3d 1239 (11th Cir. 2018).
Id. at 1251.
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resulting from the defendant's operation.8 2 As these were the only sources
of evidence the plaintiff offered, the court affirmed the district court's
grant of summary judgment to the defendant.8 3 Among other things, this
case reaffirms the Eleventh Circuit's insistence in toxic tort cases that a
plaintiff prove causation by a dose-response assessment specific to the
plaintiff rather than by more general reference to regulatory maximum
84
exposure levels.
The plaintiff lived her whole life in Tampa, Florida-three miles from
the defendant's plant in which several substances, at times, were in
excess of federal and state air quality standards.8 5 In particular, the
plant emitted sulfur dioxide in excess of the federal "National Ambient
Air Quality Standard ('NAAQS') of 75 parts per billion" and in excess of
the state maximum of 100 parts per billion.86 The plaintiff brought
several state-law claims against the defendant, including negligence,
negligence per se, and strict liability, seeking to recover for various
pulmonary ailments. To prove causation, she offered the testimony of an
expert, who opined that the plaintiffs health problems were caused by
exposure to hazardous substances emitted from the defendant's plant. 87
After deposing the expert, the defendant "moved to exclude [his]
8 8 The
testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and Daubert."
8
9
district court granted the defendant's motion. The district court also
excluded the plaintiffs own testimony-the total diminution in value to
her home due to the defendant's contamination of the surrounding airon the issue of property damage. 9o As the plaintiff was left with no
evidence, the district court granted summary judgment to the defendant
on the plaintiffs claims. 91
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's evidentiary rulings
and grant of summary judgment to the defendant. 92 On the issue of
causation, the Eleventh Circuit explained that the expert's report,
purporting to establish a causal link between the hazardous substances
in the air and the plaintiffs health issues, was flawed in three respects:

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id.

88.

Id.; FED. R. EVID. 702.

89.
90.
91.
92.

Williams, 889 F.3d at 1243.
Id. at 1244.
Id. at 1243.
Id. at 1251.

Id.
Id. at 1251 n.2.
Id. at 1242.
Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (2018); 40 C.F.R. pt. 50 (2018).
Williams, 889 F.3d at 1243.
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it "faifled] to properly assess dose-response with regard to [the plaintiff];
[it] fail[ed] to meaningfully rule out other potential causes of [the
plaintiffs] medical conditions; and [it failed] to account for the
93
background risk of her conditions."
The court devoted much of its opinion to emphasizing "the importance
94
of a dose-response assessment" to prove causation in toxic tort cases.
The court explained that "[s]tripped to its bare essentials, a
dose-response assessment estimates scientifically 'the dose or level of
exposure at which [the substance at issue] causes harm."' 95 The expert
conceded he never conducted an independent dose calculation specific
to [the plaintiff]. Instead, [the expert] relied on two academic studies
measuring the ambient air concentration of pollutants in the area in
which [the plaintiff] lived to estimate the dose she received and on the
EPA's NAAQS regulatory standards to establish the dose threshold
[the plaintiffs] conditions would likely result from her
above which
96
exposure.
The court pointed out, as the district court had, that the academic
studies actually contradicted the expert's conclusion. 97 Further, the court
reiterated "the potential methodological perils of relying... on regulatory
emissions levels to [prove] causation. 9 8 The court explained that
regulatory standards are typically protective, that is, set to include a
"cushion... to account for the most sensitive members of the population,"
whereas a dose-response calculation is predictive of the actual level of
exposure to a substance at which a person would be harmed. 99
The plaintiff argued that the EPA's NAAQS for sulfur dioxide of
seventy-five parts per billion was predictive of harm, because according
to the EPA, exposure to that level of the chemical "causes (not may cause
or can cause, but actually does cause) respiratory morbidity." 1° ° The court
rejected this argument, noting that the EPA itself has stated that "the
dose-response assessments [it used to set NAAQS standards] are not
suited to predicting the incidence of exposure-caused disease in
humans." 101

93. Id. at 1245.
94. Id. at 1246.
95. Id. (quoting McClain v. Metabolife Int'l, Inc., 401 F.3d 1233, 1241 (11th Cir. 2005)).

96. Id.
97. Id. at 1247.
98. Id.

99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
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The court avoided holding that regulatory standards were never an
appropriate basis with which to prove causation. 102 However, the court
said that the plaintiff "bore the burden of demonstrating to the District
Court that [her expert's] facial reliance on NAAQS standards was
methodologically sound" and that given the standards' "protective nature
and EPA's express warnings that those standards . . . are unreliable
predictors of conditions in humans, we are not persuaded that the
District Court erred in determining that [the plaintiff] failed to meet that
burden." 103 The court also agreed with the district court that the
plaintiffs expert's report was flawed because it "failed to meaningfully
rule out other potential causes of [the plaintiffs health] conditions," and
because it did not establish "the background risk of [those] conditions,"
that is, the risk that a person could contract the condition without
exposure to the substances in question. 104
III. ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT
In Black WarriorRiverkeeper Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,10 5
the District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, considering a
"novel issue" under the Endangered Species Act, ruled that the mandated
sixty-day notice-requirement period prior to the plaintiffs filing a citizen
suit did not begin to run until the time the defendants actually received
107
the notice, 106 rather than the time when the notice was postmarked.
The court dismissed the plaintiffs' ESA citizen suit because the suit had
been filed "fewer than sixty days after receipt of notice by both the Corps
and the Secretary."' 08 The court also granted summary judgment to the
defendants on the plaintiffs' claims under the CWA and National
Environmental Protection Act (NEPA),109 ruling "that the Corps [had
not] acted arbitrarily and capriciously in granting a CWA § 404110
[discharge] permit" to operate a surface mine within the Locust Fork
watershed in northern Alabama. 1 '
102. Id. at 1248.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1248-49.
105. No. 2:17-cv-00439-LSC, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137322 (N.D. Ala. Aug. 14, 2018).
106. See 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(2)(A)(i) (2018). "No action may be commenced under
subparagraph (1)(A) of this section--(i) prior to sixty days after written notice of the
violation has been given to the Secretary, and to any alleged violator of any such provision
or regulation." Id.
107. Black Warrior Riverkeeper, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137322, at *8-9.
108. Id. at *13.
109. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2018).
110. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2018).
111. Black WarriorRiverkeeper, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137322, at *25.
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In 2014, a mining company sought permission from the Corps to
expand its mining operations in the Locust Fork watershed with a
1293-acre surface mine, which was to be the eighteenth most active
surface mine in the area. The Corps performed a cumulative impacts
analysis of the proposed mine, including as part of its baseline analysis
for water quality and aquatic habitat both the existing surface mining
operations and the history of mining in the area, including numerous
abandoned mines that continued to impact water quality. 112 "The Corps
also [took into account that] the permittee would be required" to operate
the mine using "best management practices" imposed by the Alabama
Department of Environmental
Management
and "to employ
compensatory mitigation measures to offset environmental impacts [of
the mine]."113 The Corps concluded that the mine would have a "relatively
small cumulative impact" and issued a Finding of No Significant Impact
together with the § 404 permit, and without performing an
114
Environmental Impact Statement.
The plaintiffs filed suit under the CWA and the NEPA, challenging the
issuance of the permit. 115 Pursuant to 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(2)(A)(i), 116 the
plaintiffs mailed notice of their intent to bring a citizen suit claim under
the ESA to "the Corps and the Secretary of the Interior ("the Secretary")
on March 21, 2017."117 "The Corps received [the] written notice on March
24, and the Secretary received it on March 27th." 118 The plaintiffs
amended their original complaint to add the ESA claim on May 23, 2017,
fifty-seven days after the Secretary received the notice and sixty days
after the Corps received the notice. 119
The court first ruled that the plaintiffs' ESA claim had not been filed
at least sixty days after all the mandated parties had received notice of
the suit and therefore could not be maintained.120 The court noted that
"[t]he starting point of the required notice period presents a novel
issue."121

112.
113.
114.
that no
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id. at *2-4.
Id. at *4.
Id. at *4-5.An agency's Finding of No Significant Impact represents its conclusion
Environmental Impact Statement is necessary. Id. at *15.
Id. at*6.
16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(2)(A)(i) (2018).
Black WarriorRiverkeeper, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137322, at *6.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 13-14.
Id. at *9.

1020

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70

If the notice period began on the postmark date, then [the] Plaintiffs'
filing of the[ir] amended complaint [to add the ESA claim] 63 days
after mailing notice would be sufficient. But if the notice period began
upon receipt by all parties, then the fact that [the] Plaintiffs filed their
notice
amended complaint only 57 days after the Secretary received
122
would warrant dismissal without prejudice of the ESA claim.
To decide the question, the court first noted that other "[c]ourts have
interpreted this [notice requirement] provision strictly to ensure that all
parties have 'an opportunity to resolve the dispute and take any
' 123
and that
necessary corrective measures before a resort to the courtS,"
the notice 'requirement is jurisdictional,' and non-compliance warrants
124
dismissal."
The plaintiffs pointed to the analogous notice requirement for citizen
suits under the CWA and noted that EPA regulations interpreted the
sixty-day notice period as beginning to run on the postmark date of the
notice if the notice was mailed. 125 The court declined to follow that
principle for the ESA; however, the court noted that the ESA is
administered by the United States Fish and Wildlife Service, not the
EPA, and the Fish and Wildlife Service was not bound by interpretations
of statutory language made by another agency. 126
The court concluded there was "no precedent as to when the [ESA]
notice period" begins to run and looked to the purpose of the notice
provision itself, which the court found was to "provide[] agencies with
opportunity to take corrective measures and thereby make litigation via
citizen suits unnecessary."'1 27 The court concluded that "it would seem
necessary for the notice period to begin only once the parties ha[d]
received notice of the intent to sue."'128 The court also said that requiring
a plaintiff to find out whether the required parties had received the notice
did not pose an "undue burden."'129 "No great obstacle prevented Plaintiffs
from making inquiries into when the Secretary had received notice and
130
then delaying the filing of their amended complaint accordingly."' As a

122. Id. at *8-9.
123. Id. at *8 (quoting Water Keeper All. v. U.S. Dep't of Def., 271 F.3d 21, 29 (1st Cir.
2001)).
124. Id. (quoting Alabama v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 441 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1129
(N.D. Ala. 2006)).

125. Id. at *9-10.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at *10.
at *10-11 (citing Hallstrom v. Tillamook Cty., 493 U.S. 20, 29 (1989)).
at*11.
at *12.
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result, the court interpreted the statute as requiring a sixty-day notice
period prior to filing suit as beginning to run when all necessary parties
actually received notice and dismissed the plaintiffs' ESA claim without
1
prejudice. 31
Turning to the plaintiffs' CWA and NEPA claims, the court ruled that
the Corps had not acted arbitrarily and capriciously when it issued a
Finding of No Significant Impact for the mine and issued the § 404 permit
to the operator. 132 The court applied the "hard look" analysis 133 mandated
134
by the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Hill v. Boy.
The court found that the Corps adequately "examine[d] the potential
impacts [of the mine] by conducting a cumulative impacts analysis,
taking into account [the mine's impacts] over a 14 year period," starting
from a baseline that included the cumulative impact of past and existing
mining operations. 135 In finding that the mine would not have a
significant impact, the Corps also took into account compensatory
mitigation that would be required by the permit and other restrictions on
the mine's operation that would be imposed by state regulations. 136 For
these reasons, the court concluded that the Corps did not act arbitrarily
and capriciously when it determined that an Environmental Impact
Statement was unnecessary and when it issued the § 404 permit for the
1 37
mine.

131. Id. at *13.
132. Id. at *25.
133. Id. at *16.
134. 144 F.3d 1446, 1450 (11th Cir. 1998) (stating that when reviewing an agency's
decision not to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement under the arbitrary and
capricious standard four criteria will be applied: "[f1irst, the agency must have accurately
identified the relevant environmental concern[; s]econd... the agency.., must have taken
a 'hard look' at the problem in preparing the [Environmental Assessment;]" third, if the
agency makes a Finding of No Significant Impact, "the agency must be able to make a
convincing case for its finding[;]" and fourth, "if the agency does find an impact of true
significance," it must prepare an EIS unless it "finds that changes or safeguards in the
project sufficiently reduce the impact to a minimum."); see Black WarriorRiverkeeper, 2018
U.S. LEXIS 137322, at *16.
135. Black Warrior Riverkeeper, 2018 U.S. LEXIS 137322, at *17. The cumulative
impact analysis described here illustrates another reason why the piecemeal permitting
scheme of § 404 is inadequate to protect water resources. If the Corps starts from a baseline
of water quality in a watershed, and that baseline already includes the damaging impacts
of numerous active and abandoned mining operations on water quality, then another single
mining operation is not likely having a significant impact over the already degraded quality
of the watershed that is built into the baseline. Once that new operation is permitted,
though, it becomes part of the baseline for the next cumulative impacts analysis, and so on.
136. Id. at*18.
137. Id. at *20.
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